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BOOK REVIEWS

Jeanne M. Woods & Hope Lewis,
Human Rights and the Global
Marketplace: Economic, Social and
Cultural Dimensions (Ardsley, NY,
Transnational Publishers 2005); ISBN
1571052747; 959 pp.
The human rights community has waited
a long time for Human Rights and
the Global Marketplace, which explicates-and vindicates-long-neglected
economic, social and cultural rights.1 It
provides a thorough and rigorous introduction to their theoretical foundations,
a gripping and scholarly account of their
historical development, and an illuminating up-to-the-minute guide to their practi-

1.

2.
3.

cal applications throughout the world. It
is a stunning achievement.
There have, of course, been precursors, and Professors Jeanne M. Woods
and Hope Lewis introduce a new generation of human rights lawyers to the
groundbreaking work of Louis Henkin,
Abjorn Eide, 3 Philip Alston, and Henry
Steiner,4 as well as rising stars like Antony
Anghie s Karen Engle,6 and Makau wa
Mutua.7 But this book could not have
been written until the dust had settled
from the end of the Cold War and it
would not be so urgently needed had it
appeared before what the authors aptly
characterize as the turmoil of globalization. Human Rights and the Global
Marketplace, in short, is the right book
at the right time.'

The indivisibility of the two Covenants, their necessary interdependence, and the fallacy
of asserting the primacy of either, is now well-established in international law, at least in
theory. See Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil and
Political Rights, adopted Dec. 15, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/130, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, 209, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/130 (1989). For a concise discussion of the shift in
international priorities represented by this resolution, see Peter Meyer, THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL: A BRIEFHISTORY, IN THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS XXiii, xxxv (Paul Williams
ed., 1981). See also Louis Henkin, Preface, in Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next
Century (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence 1994). ("It is necessary to reaffirm what should
never have been questioned-that human rights are indivisible and interdependent.").
JEANNEM. WOODS & HOPE LEWIS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE:
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 101(2005); See also Louis HENKIN, GERALD L. NEUMAN, DIANE F.
ORENTLICHER
& DAVID W. LEEBRON,HUMAN RIGHTS(1999).
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, supra note 2, at

include: MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
A PERSPECTIVEON ITS DEVELOPMENT (1995); THE IMPLEMENTATION

158; Other noteworthy works
ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS:
OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL

RIGHTS: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES
(Franz

4.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE,

5.
6.
7.
8.

supra note 2, at 102; See also

PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,MORALS
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, supra note 2, at 357.

Id. at 149.
Id. at 124.
See also EMMA

COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA

P.

&

CULTURAL

Matscher ed., 1991),
HENRY J. STEINER &

(2d ed. 2000).

HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE:RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY

AND ECONOMICS
(2005) (addressing similar issues through a more domestic lens).

Human Rights Quarterly 28 (2006) 515-543 © 2006 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Even as globalization has brought
unprecedented prosperity to some, it has
brought unprecedented impoverishment
to many. The polarization between the
richest and the poorest is enormous, and
growing. The Preface notes the tension
between resistance to rights and the
selective neoliberal embrace of some
rights and asks whether post-World War II
frameworks can in fact respond to twentyfirst century realities. Even if economic,
social and cultural rights are requisite to
the enjoyment of any rights, how can they
be assured for the most vulnerable? Human Rights and the Global Marketplace
provides a powerful set of analytic tools
for justifying, understanding, and realizing these rights. This review describes
the scope and organization of the project,
noting some of the highlights and the
daunting problems that remain.
The book is divided into four freestanding but complementary parts: I.
Discursive Themes, II. International
Instruments and Their Implementation,
Ill. Power, Politics, and Poverty: Structural Challenges to the Realization of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and IV Comparative Approaches. As
the authors helpfully illustrate in their
Preface, this modular structure offers instructors a broad range of options. Once
the foundational material of the first part
is grasped, the instructor can proceed
to any of the other parts, depending on
the objectives of the course. Drawing on
politics, economics, history, philosophy,
and law, each part carefully builds on the
reader's knowledge, making an otherwise
overwhelming range of material manageable. The result is a volume that serves

9.
10.
11.
12.

both as a student-friendly introduction
to a complex and unfamiliar area of the
law, and as an invaluable resource for
scholars with a working knowledge of
economic rights in general seeking a
more recondite grasp of a particular right
or application.
Part I introduces the major themes of
the volume and serves as a compelling
introduction to human rights, accessible
to undergraduates but equally rewarding
for more sophisticated graduate and law
students. Chapter 1, Global Narratives!
Global Realities, begins with a collection
of unforgettable stories, vividly illustrating the effects of the denial of economic
rights.9 As philosopher Richard Rorty
observes, such stories drive human rights
by enabling the reader to emphasize
with those denied them. 10 They teach
compassion.
Lewis and Woods are demanding
teachers, however, and these stories
and data are also intended to stimulate
rigorous analysis and challenge feel-good
assumptions. The materials in Chapter 1
begin with three provocative questions:
(1) Why should any of these issues rise to
the level of a human rights concern?; (2) If
the problems described are human rights
violations, who are the respective rightsholders and duty-holders and what remedies would be appropriate?; and (3) How
would you rank the issues in comparison
to classic violations of civil and political
rights, for example, reports of torture of
political prisoners?" The authors suggest
that students revisit these questions as
they "continue [their] journey through
the book." 1 2 If students are engaged by
these materials, and they should be, these

This very effective method of introduction is also used in

STEINER& ALSTON,

at 3-17 (beginning with a series of "global snapshots").
Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON
128 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993).
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE,
supra note 2, at 3.
Id.

supra note 4,

HUMAN RIGHTS

111,
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questions may well engage them for life.
As other human rights texts have shown,
a human rights perspective can transform
students' understanding of the world. This
book is both more ambitious and more
subversive, however, because its human
rights framework puts economic rights at
the very center of the analysis. It not only
transforms students into human rights
advocates, but transforms our basic understanding of human rights. It is a deeply
original and galvanizing work.
The stories are remarkable for their
scope, from the persecution of raped
women in Pakistan (imprisoned or worse)
to the "education guarantee" program
in India, under which any village which
asks for teachers and books to combat
illiteracy gets them. An excerpt describes
the "mindless cheering" of anti-globalization protesters in Cancun, oblivious to the
impact of the disruption of the WTO talks
on the poorest countries. These are rich,
dense, and challenging materials. But
the authors push students even further,
raising questions that require a bit more
research and considerably more thought:
"Who are the primary beneficiaries of
agriculture subsidies, the family farmer or
agribusiness?" Students are encouraged to
support their responses by the excellent
directory of web resources at the end of
Chapter 1.
Chapter 2, Theoretical Paradigms,
is one of the longest chapters and one
of the most rewarding. The underlying
theory of human rights is often a hardsell to idealistic students, for whom the
urgency of human rights is self-evident.

13.
14.

15.

The poignant stories set out in Chapter
1 are likely to make them even more
impatient to get on with the nuts-andbolts, the legal mechanisms that will
eliminate injustice and assure the human
rights that the students do not question.
But if theory was ever a luxury,13 it is not
a luxury now.
Human rights are increasingly challenged as a western imposition-"free
market democracy" is viewed by many
as neocolonialism. There is growing
skepticism toward Western claims to
moral authority.1 4 Anyone who promotes
human rights, accordingly, needs a solid
understanding of the justifications for
doing so. Human Rights and the Global
Marketplace begins with the normative
antecedents of economic rights. Many
have noted the influence of religious
norms on human rights;"5 Woods and
Lewis include not only the familiar Judeo-Christian and Muslim sources, but
Buddhist beliefs about religious giving
and African spiritual traditions as well.
Religion focuses on the moral obligation of the individual to provide charity.
"Rights" are neither directed to individuals (or civil society), nor are they appeals
for charity. Rather, they are legally cognizable claims against the State. What
is a State? Where does it come from?
What is the source of its authority and
legitimacy? What are its obligations to
its people and how are these obligations
fulfilled? These are profound questions,
and Aristotle, Kant, and Locke remain
instructive. The excerpts here, however,
are not the familiar paens to civil and

I agree with Catherine Mackinnon that it is not. Catherine Mackinnon, Theory is Not a
Luxury, in RECONCEIVING
REALITY:WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed.,
1993).
As former Secretary of State Colin Powell recently observed, for example, the President's
proposal for the interrogation of suspected terrorists would encourage other nations to
question the "moral basis of our fight against terrorism." Fallout Sept. 10-16, N.Y. TIMES,
17 Sept. 2006, at 2.
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 2; STEINER& ALSTON, supra note 4.
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political rights but are culled from their
less well known works. Thus, Woods and
Lewis situate economic rights in the human rights canon even as they transform
our understanding of it. The authors also
draw on a wealth of comparative traditions, including the Soviet Constitution of
1936 and the Mexican Constitution. The
excerpts from the Papal Encyclicals demonstrate the long-term but often forgotten
commitment of the Catholic Church to
16
vulnerable populations.
Economic rights have been criticized,
of course, by the left as well as the right.17
The sampling here is sharp and focused,
from the American Anthropological
Society's challenge to the premise of
universalism back in 1947 to the cogent
feminist, post-colonial, and critical race
critiques.1 8 This chapter alone could serve
as a text for an intellectually rewarding
seminar.
Part I introduces students to the basic
elements of economic rights and provides
a vocabulary with which to constructively
analyze them. It also introduces students
to the fundamental legal, political,
economic, philosophical, and religious
precepts that animate the discourse and
bring it to life. Some of these will be
familiar to human rights teachers but a
great deal of it is new. Lewis and Woods
draw on a truly global range of sources
and perspectives in part because they are
addressing economic and social rights
that have long been neglected and also

16.
17.

18.
19.
20.

21.
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because their vision of "human rights"
is more global, less Western, than that
of an earlier generation of human rights
scholars.
They also bring a fresh perspective
to familiar materials. The Paquete Habana, for example, is presented as an
economic rights case. 9 Many American
international law texts cite this 1900 Supreme Court case for the proposition that
20
"International law is part of our law."
Lewis and Woods use it to show universal
support for the proposition that fishermen
had a right to earn a living.
Part 11, International Instruments and
Implementation, is the doctrinal core of
the subject and often the focal point of a
human rights text or course. The authors
provide a concise but thorough introduction to the basic principles and textual
sources of international human rights,
beginning with the explicit reference to
economic, social and cultural rights in
Article 55 of the UN Charter.2 Like the
other human rights instruments cited, the
Charter is not set out in a separate supplement or appendix, but incorporated in
the main text. This encourages students
to read the actual instruments. While
students do not have the complete text at
hand, US students are likely to have ready
access to the internet and the authors
helpfully provide addresses.
Students sometimes find human rights
treaties abstract. Wood and Lewis address
this with a simple exercise requiring them

supra note 2, at 64-67.
"Rights", according to Karl Marx, are basically a liberal conception, and in fundamental
opposition to "species-being", or human solidarity. KARL MARX, ON THE JEWISHQUESTION
(1843).
RECONCEIVING
REALITY:WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 2, at 77.
Id. at 67.
JORDON J. PAUST, JOAN M. FITZPATRICK & JON M. VAN DYKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN
THE U.S. 84 (2000), MARK JANIS& JOHN NOYES, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 92 (3d ed. 2006), LORI
DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LAW 63 (4th ed. 2001.)
U.N. CHARTERart. 55, signed 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153
(entered into force 24 Oct. 1945).
RECONCEIVING
REALITY:WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
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to apply the articles of the Covenant to a
specific, concrete subject; i.e., whether
there is in fact a "right to water." Some of
the questions set out in the text also suggest fruitful paper topics: "What are the
philosophical foundations of the ICESCR?
Compare the right and principles elaborated in the Covenant to the philosophical, religious, and political principles
described in Chapter 2. " 22 Questions like
these can be the basis for a thoughtful
class discussion or for a deeper inquiry
in the form of a research paper.
The authors demystify economic
rights law by explaining the processes
through which it is formed. They explain
that the Limberg Principles, for example,
grew out of a meeting convened in 1986
by international law experts from the
International Commission of Jurists, the
Urban Morgan Institute, and the University of Limberg to consider the nature
and scope of the obligations imposed
under the Covenant. The results were
updated by another group of human
rights experts who met in the Netherlands
in 1997. The resulting Maastricht Guidelines, published in 2000, demonstrate
the growing importance of economic
rights.23 They observe, for example, that
the gap between the rich and the poor
has doubled since 1970, with the poorest fifth receiving 1.4 percent of global
24
income and the richest fifth 85 percent.
Excerpts from the Guidelines, along
with the Committee's Comment on The
Nature of State Parties Obligations clarify
the meaning of "violations," which may
be passive as well as active, and give
students an opportunity to compare and
contrast first generation rights regarding

the duties to respect, protect, and fulfill.
The authors also provide a brief overview
describing the work of the Committee.
Again, they bring the subject to life
with a practical problem, affordable
housing in the Dominican Republic.
By providing the facts (through the
Committee's Concluding Observations
on the Dominican Republic's Report,
and also drawing on "detailed and precise information" from NGOs) and the
standards (distilled from the Reporting
Guidelines as well as the Committee's
General Comment No. 4 (1991), The
Right to Adequate Housing), Lewis and
Wood offer an exercise in hands-on
problem-solving, especially well-suited
to collaborative work: "You have been
asked to submit proposals to the President ...on how the government can (1)
respect (2) protect and (3) fulfill the right
to housing."2" Students are reminded to
"address the specific problems raised
in the Observations, and include both
legislative and programmatic initiatives
for resolving them," while taking into
account the General Comment.
Woods and Lewis also draw on
some surprising sources. To illustrate
the responsible acknowledgment of the
ongoing costs of slavery, for example, they
provide excerpts from a speech by President George W. Bush on Gor~e Island,
Senegal in 2003, "My nation's journey
toward justice has not been easy and it is
not over. The racial bigotry fed by slavery
did not end with slavery or with segregation. And many of the issues that still
trouble America have roots in the bitter
experience of other times." 26 It is a quiet,
heart-stopping moment. Such jewels are

supra note 2, at 188.
The Maastricht Guidelines on Violoations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20
Hum. RTS. Q. 691 (1998).
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 214-15.
RECONCEIVING
REALITY:WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
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strewn liberally throughout this volume.
Thus, despite the divisive rhetoric of the
Cold War,2 7 the authors avoid polemics.
Instead, they focus on constructive
engagement with a range of potential
constituencies. In addition to the Covenant and its regional counterparts, the
authors include relevant portions of the
Race Convention, the Women's Convention, and the Children's Convention,
showing that economic and social rights
are crucial for each and highlighting
the relationship between the denial of
economic rights and broad forms of political and social subordination. Students
will learn that economic rights are also
the focus of multiple ILO Conventions.
They will come to understand how these
varied instruments, drafted over decades
and over continents, together constitute
a strong and flexible network, albeit a
network too often ignored.
The reasons for this are explored in
Part Ill, Power, Politics, and Poverty: Structural Challengers. As Professor Alston
suggests in a recent article, the UN Millennium Development Goals and human
rights share many objectives, yet remain
for the most part distinct and uncoordinated projects.2 8 The same might be
said of human rights and development in
general. This is not only inefficient, but
may well be counterproductive. Chapter
5, Human Development and Human
27.

28.

29.
30.

Vol. 29

Rights, squarely situates development in
the context of human rights and human
rights in the context of development. This
chapter introduces the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) established after
World War II, focusing on the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund,
and explains how they have evolved
to reflect and shape a post-colonial
world.2 9 The post-Cold War "Washington
Consensus" relies on private markets,
rather than "State-led development", to
promote economic growth which will
benefit everyone. Studies by the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights,
however, suggest that the Washington
Consensus in fact exacerbates poverty, especially for the most vulnerable.
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs),
for example, designed to ensure fiscal
responsibility for spendthrift States, have
slashed social safety nets for those who
need them most.30 In a typical thoughtprovoking twist, the authors present a
case study of "underdevelopment in poor
communities", not in the global South,
but in the United States.
Chapter 6, Self-Determination, Culture
and Rights deals with some of the most
difficult material in the human rights canon, the conquest of indigenous peoples,
and the complicity of the international
law of "discovery" in the process.31 This
chapter details the violation of the most

As Philip Alston noted in an influential article on the ICESCR, "many Americans ...
think of it as a . . . 'Covenant on Uneconomic Socialist and collective 'Rights'."' Philip
Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The
Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 366 (1990).
Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and
Development Debate Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals,
27 HUM. RTS. Q. 755 (2005).

See generally Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in
Nineteenth Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (1999).
See, e.g., JOSEPHE. STIGLITz, GLOBALIZATION AND ITSDISCONTENTS18 (2002) (explaining how
SAPs have left countries like Bolivia worse off).

31.

The role of law in the appropriation of indigenous land is widely acknowledged. Native
Americans' land, for example, was reduced from 138 million acres to 48 million acres.
RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 469.
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basic human rights over decades and the
ongoing repercussions. It traces the right
to self-determination from eighteenth
and nineteenth century revolutions in
Europe to the enshrinement in the UN
Charter of the right of cohesive national
groups to autonomy. The authors explore
the right in the two concrete contexts:
indigenous peoples and the rights of
people living under foreign occupation.
Lively excerpts from the recent work of
Benedict Kingsbury and James Anaya
make the complicated, tortured history
all too vivid.32 As Kingsbury notes, the
"most powerful argument for a distinctive
legal category. . . of indigenous peoples
is wrongful deprivation, above all, of
land, territory, self-government, means
of livelihood, language and identity. The
3
appeal is thus to history and culture."
This chapter shows how international
human rights law has been used both to
34
deny and to protect cultural rights.
In The "Exotic Other"-Gender, Culture and Religious Traditions, the authors
consider the tension between individual
and collective rights in a controversial
context, whether Muslim women and
girls can be forbidden-or forced-to
wear the veil1. 3 As accounts of women
murdered by both sides prove, this may
be a matter of life or death. Elaine Sciollino suggests that there are two overlapping conflicts within contemporary Islam,
the first between traditional Islam and
modernity, and the second between the
individual and the State. As the well-

32.
33.
34.

35.
36.

known human rights scholar Abdullah An
Na'im explains: "[C]ompliance with human rights standards cannot be achieved
in a principled and sustainable manner
except through the internal
dynamics of
36
the culture concerned."
The section concludes with a role
play on the equally inflammatory issue of female circumcision, or female
genital mutilation (FGM). By including
"representatives of traditional practitioners" as well as both indigenous and
American NGOs, the authors insist that
readers take into account the prospects
for uncircumcised women in certain
traditional cultures.
Part IV, Comparative Approaches, is for
the activists, those who tore through the
earlier readings on theory and doctrine
looking for practice tips. This Part focuses
on judicial enforcement at the domestic
level, where human rights are most likely
to be implemented. It also includes a
section on the growing economic rights
jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR), suggesting that
implementation on a regional level may
also be possible, at least in Europe.
This Part outlines four quite distinct
approaches: India's directive principles,
South Africa's Constitution, the "blending
of [public and private] categories" by the
ECHR, and the use of state constitutions
in the United States. These illustrate the
range of legal mechanisms already developed and may well inspire creative
approaches likely to lead to more. At

Id. at 456.
Id. at 457.
The authors again bring home the important lessons that human rights issues are not
"out there" but right here in the United States by citing the US Supreme Court decision in Meyer v. State of Nebraska, which struck down a Nebraskan statute barring the
teaching of German to a ten year old, illustrate the recognition of cultural rights. Id. at
548.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 603.
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the same time, the authors are careful to
situate each approach in the particular
historical and political context in which
it emerged. In India, for example, social
action litigation (SAL) since the 1980s,
and a receptive Indian Supreme Court,
have transformed the role of the judiciary in promoting social and economic
rights. Through "epistolary jurisdiction",
letters written on behalf of disadvantaged
groups become judicially cognizable
"writ petitions." Courts address these
concerns through a range of measures,
from appointing socio-legal commissions
to investigate the alleged violations, to
compensating and rehabilitating victims
and monitoring environmental pollution.
But the authors' respect for the groundbreaking work of the Indian Supreme
Court does not keep them from criticizing
its reluctance to intervene "when [the
state's] vision of economic development
threatens life, land, and sustainable livelihoods."37 They interrogate conventional
human rights assumptions of progress
and universalism, similarly, even as they
question whether certain forms of "scholarly debate [might] serve to alienate
women as opposed to promoting global
understanding and advancing
important
3
women's rights issues."

1

South Africa offers an instructive
counterpoint to the Indian experience.
After a brief historical introduction to
South African history, including its brutal
legacy of apartheid, the authors set out
the legal text of what has been widely
lauded as the most progressive Constitution in the world. They urge students to
compare and contrast the South African
and Indian Constitutions and to compare

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

701.
684.
743.
786.
793.
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the South African Bill of Rights with the
Economic Covenant. This demands a
close reading and mastery of doctrine.
The cases that follow, including a welledited excerpt from Grootboom, show
students what is 39
at stake and why their
effort is worth it.
The chapter on the Council of Europe,
focusing on the jurisprudence of the
ECHR, explains the historical dichotomy
between private law, which addresses
disputes between individuals, and public
law, which addresses disputes between
individuals and the State. In Europe, "civil
rights" refer to those contract rights which
are the concern of private law, while
"public rights" refer to the rights set out in
statutes, which are the concern of public
law. Through a series of carefully-edited
decisions, this chapter shows how these
categories have become interwoven.
The ECHR has increasingly protected
economic and social rights through procedural, process-type guarantees, from its
1986 refusal to consider health insurance
a public right in the Netherlands40 to the
1993 decision in which it held that Italy
violated its citizen's "public" procedural
rights by failing to decide its application
for welfare benefits for six years. 41 Both
cases relied on the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights. Holding that Article
6 applied even where the underlying
dispute involved civil (private) rights, the
ECHR offered another avenue for relief
in a broad range of matters, from clean
drinking water to legal aid. The ECHR
has also found a "positive dimension"
in Article 8 of the Convention, which
provides in pertinent part that, "Everyone
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has a right to respect for his private and
family life." 42 In L6pez Ostra v. Spain the
ECHR held that "severe environmental
pollution" could serve as the basis for a
4
claim under Article 8. 1
Chapter Ten, The United States of
America: Federal Rejection, State Protection, concludes the volume by bringing it
all back home. In the chapters on India,
South Africa, and Europe, the authors
made the strange familiar; here, they
make the familiar strange. They begin
with the original US Constitution and its
protection of "property rights"-including
rights in human property, or slaves. They
show through the familiar line of Supreme
Court cases, from Dandridge to Harris v.
Macrae, the steadfast refusal to find economic rights in the Constitution.4 Rather,
the Court insists on what many criticize as
an illusory distinction between "negative"
45
and "positive" rights.
This does not mean that the United
States does not need economic rights.
Although "considered as a group, and
compared to the rest of the world, the
US is quite well off,"46 but in fact, millions of US citizens are in fact deprived
of the most basic economic rights, from
the 71.7 million without health insurance
to the 19.8 percent of US children living
42.
43.
44.

45.

46.
47.
48.
49.

in poverty. 47 The authors cite Professor
Henkin for the proposition that the US
has not kept pace with other Western
democracies, including France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom, which have all
developed well beyond the "minimum
welfare state." 48 The data becomes even
more sobering when Amartya Sen shifts
the focus to "capability poverty." Mortality rates for African Americans fall behind
Indians in Kerala and African American
men "fall well behind the immensely
49
poorer men of China" as well.
The United States backwardness on
the federal level is somewhat assuaged
by what the authors portray as encouraging developments on the state level.
They helpfully set out economic rights
guarantees in fourteen state constitutions
and excerpts from state courts which have
found affirmative economic rights even
in the absence of unambiguous textual
authority. They conclude on a hopeful
note, referring to the "vibrant and grass
roots and civil society movement" for
economic rights, in which both authors
have played important roles.
This volume, however, is undoubtedly
their most important contribution to date.
It is not only a rich and rewarding immersion in economic rights, but an invitation

id.at 808.
id.at 812.
For a cogent account of these suits, see Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the
Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERSL.J. 881, 886-93 (1989) (tracing the attempt to
use the Federal Constitution to authorize judicially enforceable rights). See also Mary
E. Becker, Politics, Differences and Economic Rights, U. CHI. LEGALF. 169, 190 (1989)
(suggesting that "some entirely new standard of review for economic legislation" could
correct the enduring economic and political problems of women). For a persuasive
argument that the political process has not worked for the poor, see Stephen Loffredo,
Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1309 (1993).
As shown in Justice Brennan's eloquent dissent in Deshaney v. Winnebago Country. Woons
& LEwIs, supra note 2, at 842. However the Court has not always been unanimous on
the issue. DeShaney is well-known to US constitutional and family law teachers, and it
has been cited in at least one other human rights text. STEINER& ALSTON, supra note 4.
RECONCEIVING
REALITY:WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 2, at 865.
Id. at 865-67.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 867-68.
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to join in the practical work of building a
culture of economic rights. It offers a vast
amount of material, nuanced and comprehensive, pragmatic and useful. Neither
the text, nor any course based on any of
its constituent parts, will be easy. Rather,
it is difficult, demanding, complicated,
and often frustrating work-like the
struggle for economic rights itself. Like
that struggle, however, it is absolutely
necessary for anyone seeking to further
human rights.
Barbara Stark
Hofstra Law School
Barbara Stark teaches International Human
Rights, International Law, and International
Family Law at Hofstra Law School in New
York. She is the author of International Family
Law: An Introduction.

"Honour" Crimes, Paradigms, and
Violence against Women (Lynn
Welchman & Sara Hossain eds.,
London: Zed Books; Melbourne:
Spinifex, 2005), 384 pp. ISBN: 184277-626-6.
"Honour": Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence against Women is the outcome of a
five year project undertaken by the Centre of Islamic and Middle Eastern Laws
(CIMEL) and The International Centre for
the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS) on the "Strategies to Address
Crimes of Honour" project. As part of the
broader project, CIMEL and INTERIGHTS
have also established an online bibliography on "crimes of honour" consisting
of an annotated bibliography and case
summaries. 1 The project, which began in
1999, aims to provide, for the first time,
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a comprehensive analysis of "crimes of
honor." To this end, "Honour": Crimes,
Paradigms, and Violence against Women
explores the factors that create, facilitate,
and perpetuate these crimes and, in doing so, seeks to address a lacuna in legal
scholarship and community understanding about the nature and extent of crimes
of honor.
"Honour": Crimes, Paradigms, and
Violence against Women also seeks to
develop culturally sensitive strategies
to address and combat this practice.
Together, the authors in this volume address five main themes, namely: (1) the
meaning of crimes of honor; (2) patriarchy
and its role in perpetuating and sustaining
crimes of honor; (3) the operation of parallel legal systems and their relationship
with crimes of honor; (4) the existence
of crimes of honor in the global context;
and (5) strategies for reform.

I. CRIMES OF HONOR
Crimes of honor are defined by CIMEL
and INTERIGHTS, for the purpose of this
Project, to encompass:
[A] variety of manifestations of violence
against women, including "honour killings," assault, confinement or imprisonment, and interference with choice in
marriage, where the publicly articulated
"justification" isattributed to a social order
claimed to require the preservation of a
concept of "honour" vested in male (family and/or conjugal) control over women
and specifically women's sexual conduct:
actual, suspected or potential 2
Welchman and Hossain caution, however, that "[tihe definition of 'crimes of
honour' is by no means straightforward,"3

1.

See, available at http://www.soas.ac.uk/honourcrimes.

2.

"HONOUR": CRIMES,PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINSTWOMEN

3.

sain eds. (2005).
Id.

4 (Lynn Welchman & Sara Hos-
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conceding that its meaning is inherently
problematic. They suggest, for example,
that the terminology employed is imprecise, and susceptible to "exoticization,"
particularly in the West 4-a theme
explored by Purna Sen in her chapter,
"'Crimes of Honour,' Value and Meaning." s Welchman and Hossain also caution that the use of the phrase "crimes
of honor" lends support to the idea that
honor is intricately tied to women and
women's behavior, noting that it "seems
to imply that women 'embody' the
honour of males." 6 The acceptance of
this language is also problematic, they
argue, insofar as it adopts the meaning
articulated by its perpetrator and masks
the "real motivation" behind the violation
of women's rights!
In addition to these issues, several
authors (see, for example, Welchman and
Hossain, Connors, and Sen) also discuss
the problematic relationship between
crimes of honor and crimes of passion,
including the stereotypical association of
honor with Islamic law and the East, and
passion with the West.' While acknowledging the difficulties associated with
defining the phrase "crimes of honor,"
Welchman and Hossain, along with the
other authors in this volume, ultimately
seek to locate their discussion of crimes
of honor within an understanding of
violence against women and in the
broader framework of international human rights law.
Although the meaning and use of
the phrase "crimes of honor" are clearly
contested within the international hu4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 140.

man rights movement, the concept of
honor remains central to any definition
of this phrase. Collectively, the authors
demonstrate how the concept of honor
has been employed with a view not
only to regulating women's sexuality
and sexual behavior, but also other types
of behavior deemed to challenge male
power and control.9 Touma-Sliman, for
example, recalls that while the majority
of crimes of honor she studied concerned
sexual relations outside marriage, there
remained "a significant number of cases
where this was not the case, supporting
the notion that, over the years, the meaning of 'honour' has expanded to include
any behaviour by a woman not approved
by family members, such as challenging
male authority and taking responsibility
for her own life." 10
Research undertaken by the Centre
for Egyptian Women's Legal Assistance
(CEWLA) supports a broad interpretation
of honor:
A judgement that a woman has behaved
badly does not necessarily involve some
sexual deed on her part; laughing too
loud in a public street or enjoying talking
to a male stranger might be enough for a
judgement that a woman has compromised
her good reputation ('ard), bringing punishment for her and shame for her family."
Warraich's discussion on honor killings
and the law in Pakistan also demonstrates
a shift from the use of honor to regulate
women's sexuality and sexual behavior
to a complete subordination of women.
He notes, for example, that:
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Traditionally, "honour killings" were committed or claimed to be committed upon
discovering a woman family member
indulging in extramarital sex, but over
the years the claimed justifications have
widened to include women's expression of
autonomy, for example, exercising choice
in marriage or a decision to seek divorce.
Additionally, allegations of engaging in
"dishonourable" acts/behaviour have also
become tools for extortion, settling family feuds or exacting revenge upon an
opponent.2
In light of the problematic use of
the phrase crimes of honor, "Honour':
Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence against
Women encourages readers to be informed by local understandings of this
phenomenon. Chapters such as Sen's
"'Crimes of Honour,' Value and Meaning," and An-Na'im's "The Role of 'Community Discourse' in Combating 'Crimes
of Honour': Preliminary Assessment and
Prospect," for example, explore different
strategies on how best to engage with
protagonists at this level (see "Strategies
for Reform" below).

II.

PATRIARCHY

13

While the various authors recognize
and emphasize that culture and religion
are often employed to excuse or justify
violations of women's rights, they advise
readers against the present tendency to

12.
13.

14.
15.
16.

Vol. 29

identify crimes of honor with the East
or as a purely Islamic phenomenon. By
demonstrating that crimes of honor are
common to all religions, cultures, and
societies,"4 "Honour": Crimes, Paradigms,
and Violence against Women demonstrates to readers that crimes of honor
are not specific to a particular religion,
culture, or geographical area, but rather
are principally derived from and sustained in patriarchy and the privileging of
male power and sexuality. As Hoyek et.
al. note, "[t]he connection made between
the concept of honour and women's bodies, as a source of shame, is at the heart of
patriarchal culture."1" Where concepts of
honor are seen to reside in the bodies of
women, "[f]rameworks of 'honour', and
its corollary 'shame', operate to control,
direct and regulate women's sexuality and
freedom of movement by male members
of the family." 6 To this extent, crimes of
honor can be said to reinforce patriarchal
hierarchies within society under an assumption of masculine superiority and
feminine inferiority.
Through its detailed consideration
of patriarchy, "Honour": Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence against Women
demonstrates how the concept of honor
is invoked by a wide variety of societies
in multifaceted and elaborate ways to
control and subordinate women's sexuality in particular, and women in general.
Authors, such as Bettiga-Boukerbout,

Id. at 79.
On patriarchy, see for example, GERDA LERNER,
THE CREATIONOF PATRIARCHY
(1986); Janet Rifkin,
Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 83 (1980); REBECCAJ. COOK
& LISA M. KELLY,POLYGYNY AND CANADA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDERINTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A
REPORTFOR THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE10-14 (forthcoming 2006), available at http://justice.
gc.ca/; Manar Hasan, The Politics of Honor: Patriarchy, the State and the Murder of
Women in the Name of Family Honour, 21 J. ISRAELIHIST. 1 (2002).
See, e.g., the chapters by Bettiga-Boukerbout, Pimentel et. al., Siddiqui, and Bredel,
"HONOUR": CRIMES,PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCEAGAINSTWOMEN, supra note 2.
Id. at 134.
Id. at xi.
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consider how patriarchal values are
invoked and endorsed by various religious institutions. Bettiga-Boukerbout,
for instance, recounts the history of
crimes of honor in Italy and considers
the significant influence that the Catholic
Church has had imposing its patriarchal
views that underscore the use of violence
against women in Italian society. Others,
including Pimentel et al, Warraich and
Chakravarti, consider how patriarchal
values have come to be entrenched in
the law-both in terms of its substantive content and continued application.
Pimentel et al, for example, consider the
defense of crimes of honor to be based
"on arguments that link the law to a patriarchal moral framework." 7 Consequently,
they engage in an examination of "the
deeply rooted institutionalized gender
discrimination present in the interpretation and application of law on crimes of
violence against women," 18 and discuss
how national laws in Latin America
condone crimes of honor by granting
impunity to offenders and by relying on
discriminatory stereotypes, prejudices,
and attitudes towards women.
Other chapters in the volume focus
on the social construction of patriarchal
attitudes and prejudices against women.
Hoyek et al, for example, write that:
Criminal behaviour in "crimes of honour"
is not motivated by emotional factors
alone; rather, this emotional reaction is
learned and acquired. The killer learns the
motivations, the justification, and the crime
in such a situation is an expression of the
force of certain values, a consequence of
the standards and patterns of behaviour and
the rules and norms that the individual has

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 260.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 164.

acquired through the social process of upbringing. These values and patterns prepare
him as a person for the commission of this
type of crime, justified within the sociocultural context in which he lives.19
Shalhoub-Kevorkian, in her chapter
"Researching Women's Victimization in
Palestine: A Socio-Legal Analysis," also
considers the role patriarchy plays in
facilitating "the creation of cultural frameworks that internalise and strengthen the
inferior status of women."20 In particular,
Shalhoub-Kevorkian emphasizes the
role family plays in regulating women's
inferior status. She notes, for example,
that "[f]emale vulnerability is aggravated
by the patriarchal power structure of
Arab families, which not only justifies
inequality between men and women but
also increases the ability of male family
members to further control, misuse and
abuse women."21

III. PARALLEL LEGAL SYSTEMS
A central theme to emerge from "Honour": Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence
against Women is the operation of parallel legal systems and their relationship
with crimes of honor. This theme is a
particular focus of Shalhoub-Kevorkian's
and Begikhani's chapters, while each of
the country-specific chapters analyze
how state legal systems endorse, accommodate, or challenge crimes of honor as
a practice which discriminates against
women. Shalhoub-Kevorkian suggests
that, in Palestine, it is the informal customary system and not the formal legal
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system that dictates responses to crimes
of honor. She considers collaboration
between criminal justice personnel and
tribal leaders, and how the formal legal
and informal tribal systems of justice
have collaborated with regard to gender
related issues to discriminate and further
oppress women. 22 Given her findings,
Shalhoub-Kevorkian argues that effective
responses to crimes of honor require an
examination of both legal systems. She
notes, however, that "[als yet, no studies
have discussed the connection between
the two systems of law enforcement, and
how the existence of the two has affected
23
their mutual evolution."
Like Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Begikhani's
chapter "Honour-Based Violence among
the Kurds: The Case of Iraqi Kurdistan"
also discusses the relationship between
parallel legal systems and crimes of
honor. Begikhani describes the role
of Kurdish tribal law with respect to
crimes of honor. In particular, Begikhani
concentrates her discussion on the role
of komelayeti, that is, "a structure run
by elderly, religious, political and tribal
representatives that assumes the responsibility for hearing disputes, passing
judgement and enforcing sanctions and
solutions. It is a tribally based procedure
used to achieve reconciliation (mesreti
or solih) between families or groups in
conflict."2 4 She notes that "[plerhaps most
importantly, the route to a more positive
transformation is presented with deeply
entrenched obstacles, forged within the
heritage of tribal social structure (most
graphically expressed in the reliance
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.
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upon the komelayeti)." 25 Begikhani's
discussion also considers the problematic
nature of women's previous involvement
in discriminatory tribal practices and its
impact on current reform efforts.
As demonstrated by Shalhoub-Kevorkian and Begikhani in their respective
chapters, parallel legal systems have
had a definite impact on the creation,
facilitation, and perpetuation of crimes
of honor. In light of the evidence put
forward in these and other chapters in this
volume, Shalhoub-Kevorkian quite rightly
signals the need for further research into
the connection between formal systems
of law and informal tribal law, including
how the two systems operate to entrench
discrimination against women. More
broadly, "Honor": Crimes, Paradigms,
and Violence against Women underscores
the value of critically engaging with the
various-cultural, religious, and traditional-systems upon which proponents
of crimes of honor seek to legitimate their
practice. In doing so, "Honor": Crimes,
Paradigms, and Violence against Women
encourages readers to view such systems
not as homogeneous or static constructs
that intrinsically discriminate against
women, but rather as plural and internally
diverse systems, capable of change and
reconstruction.
Legal commentators, such as Celestine
Nyamu 26 and Madhavi Sunder 27, also
champion the need for critical engagement with parallel legal systems. Nyamu,
for example, writes that "[i]n order to respond effectively to deficiencies of gender
hierarchy based on culture, proponents

Id. at 166-67, 172.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 226.
Celestine Nyamu, How Should Human Rights And Development Respond To Cultural
Legitimization Of Gender Hierarchy In Developing Countries, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 381
(2000).
Madhavi Sunder, Piercing The Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003).
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of gender equality . . . must understand
the ways in which formal legal institutions, culture and customary practices
interact." 28 Rights activists, she argues,
must acknowledge "the flexibility and
variation of custom in order to challenge
the arguments that deploy culture as a
justification for gender inequalities." 29 On
this basis, Nyamu calls on activist to "appropriate positive openings presented by
cultural and religious traditions, instead
of dismissing culture as a negative influence."30 In the same way, Sunder seeks to
demonstrate how women's rights activists
in various Muslim societies have critically
engaged with discriminatory cultural and
religious practices, without relinquishing
their religious or cultural identities.

IV. GLOBAL CONTEXT
In an attempt to highlight the significance
of contextualizing crimes of honor, several authors in this volume demonstrate
how "colonial heritage and contemporary global power structures (military,
political, economic and other) necessarily complicate strategies of response to
violence against women." 1
Sen, for example, traces the impact of
colonialism on present efforts to reform
crimes of honor, noting that colonial
discourses continue to "shape and complicate the possibilities not only for international alliances but also for the safety
and reception of indigenous voices that
contest crimes of honor."" She writes:

28.
29.
30.
31
32.
33.
34.

There are voices in post-colonial states

that have consistently and clearly fought
violence against women, including crimes
of honor, in their own societies. But the
history of the nature of colonial interventions on gender provides great ammunition
to detractors in their condemnation of
women's rights activists as Western influ-

enced, untrue to their cultural traditions
and the unwitting or nafve agents of a
post-colonial project. The post-September
11 climate has strengthened these tendencies, as a polarisation of the West against
the rest has played directly into such binary
models that divide absolutely.3
Emphasizing the need to understand the
particular historical context when questioning practices such as crimes of honor,
Sen rejects the Western Orientalist gaze
that has linked Islam intrinsically with
crimes of honor and, instead, argues that
those alliances that are forged outside a
colonial frame of reference will be the
most effective in the struggle against
crimes of honor.
Authors such as Begikhani, ShalhoubKevorkian, and Touma-Sliman direct their
attention to the impact of military hostilities and national/community instability
with respect to efforts to reform crimes of
honor. Touma-Sliman, for instance, considers how the struggle against 'crimes
of honor' faded from the public debate
following renewed political and military
hostilities in Israel-hostilities that have
seen "the women's social agenda" rendered almost invisible in the face of the
national political agenda. 4 Begikhani
further develops Touma-Sliman's discus-

Nyamu, supra note 26, at 382.
Id.
Id.
"HoNoUR": CRIMES, PARADIGMS,AND VIOLENCE AGAINSTWOMEN,

Id. at 43.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 197.

supra note 2, at 17.
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sion, writing that: "it is not difficult to
appreciate that a fertile breeding ground
has been created for the growth of elements committed to tradition and supposed religious orthodoxy, in particular
groups operating as Islamic fundamentalists." 3" Chapters such as these highlight
a major challenge for women's rights
activists moving forward, namely, how
to maintain an effective struggle against
crimes of honor in the face of periods of
military hostility and national/community
instability.

V.

STRATEGIES FOR REFORM

Having rendered visible the connections
between culture, religion, law, and patriarchy, "Honour": Crimes, Paradigms,
and Violence against Women argues
that it is necessary to develop strategies
for reform that challenge and transform
patriarchal viewpoints sustaining and
perpetuating crimes of honor and, more
broadly, violence against women. Herein
lies the greatest challenge for women's
rights activists. The task of challenging
and transforming patriarchy is neither
straightforward nor uncomplicated. At
the very least, challenging patriarchal
practices and attitudes, which for time immemorial have safeguarded male power
and superiority, is likely to illicit backlash
from ardent proponents of patriarchy. This
does not mean, however, that activists
should not engage with these issues. On
the contrary, the entrenched nature of patriarchy in all societies intensifies the urgency for reform efforts. While "Honor":
Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence against
Women recognizes the need to engage
with patriarchy, this is but the first step
in the process of reform. Activists must

35.

Id.at 221.
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now develop specific strategies on how
best to engage with the issues identified
in this volume.
Central to "Honor": Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence against Women is its
focus on developing culturally sensitive
strategies to address and combat crimes
of honor in a globalized world. With this
in mind, the authors in this volume take
a holistic approach to the issue of crimes
of honor, engaging with the above themes
from a variety of perspectives-cultural,
community, judicial, political, and economic.
As discussed above, Sen seeks to engage with the issue of culture, emphasizing the need to understand the particular
historical context when challenging discriminatory cultural practices. She argues
that Western activists need to recognize
that violence exists everywhere, including
the West, and that failure to recognize divergent views within a particular culture
is ultimately counterproductive to efforts
to eliminate crimes of honor. Dismissing
absolutist rejection of culture by outside
forces as the driving force behind these
crimes, Sen explores a range of potential
alliances that might best aid the struggle
against crimes of honor. To this end, Sen
suggests that those alliances that allow for
both specificity and commonality within
a structure, and alliances to be forged
outside a colonial frame of reference will
be most effective. In short, a culturally
sensitive methodology is required within
which deference is paid to local activists
working from inside their own culture.
While other activists have an important
role to play in nourishing, supporting, and
providing ideas and solidarity, Sen argues
that the primary focus in the struggle
against crimes of honor should remain
with local voices.
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An-Na'im continues and further
explores Sen's discussion on the importance of locating challenges to crimes of
honor within internal dialogue or, what
he calls, "community discourse." AnNa'im argues, for example, that while
there is a definite role for different types
of advocacy work, such advocacy must
necessarily include actors located within
the local community engaged in internal
discourse. He suggests that such an approach is necessary in order to transform
family and community attitudes regarding
crimes of honor as well as institutional
responses to this phenomenon. While
An-Na'im supports a human rights approach to combating crimes of honor,
he argues that such an approach absent
community discourse will be ineffective
in challenging these acts of violence. AnNa'im suggests that the benefit of locating
strategies to combat crimes of honor in
community discourse is "respect for the
moral autonomy of individuals and families, and the self-determination of their
communities." 36 He notes as follows:
Unless one subscribes to the patronising
and authoritarian view that people should
simply be coerced into "doing what isgood
for them," it is necessary to gain their cooperation and support through an internal
discourse within the community around
cultural norms and institutions associated
with these crimes. This is not to imply that
one should postpone protecting women
against "crimes of honor," as I emphasise
that practical measures should be taken immediately to safeguard the physical safety
of women and hold perpetrators of "crimes
of honor" legally accountable. Rather, the
question is one of long-term strategy-in
addition to, not instead of, all that can be
done immediately.37

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 65.
Id.
Id.at 199.
Id.

In a similar way, the chapter authored
by Reem Abu Hassan and Lynn Welchman focuses on the interplay between
local and international attention directed
toward crimes of honor. The authors
begin by recognizing the important role
that international attention can play in
campaigns such as the present one:
This international attention can be supportive and can assist local strategies of
response by giving a global context to the
work and avoiding the impression that
this is a particularly 'Jordanian problem'
through placing the issue where it belongs,
in the global framework of violence against
women38
Hassan and Welchman, however, also
explore the problematic nature of misconceived strategies such as "when-as
is sometimes the case-links are made,
inadvertently or deliberately, with Islam,
or with some monolithic notion of 'Arab
culture' or 'Jordanian culture."' 3 9
In her chapter entitled "There is no
'Honor' in Domestic Violence, Only
Shame!," Hannana Siddiqui advocates
the use of "mature multiculturalism" to
address crimes of honor in the United
Kingdom. Discussing the problematic
nature of multiculturalism and arguments
based in cultural relativism, Siddiqui
notes that:
[Ilt
was no surprise to us that these men
felt so free to make such horrific threats
and comments on camera with impunity
and pointed to how multicultural assumptions had prevented the police from acting.
Such assumptions include the view that it
is intolerant, or even racist, for a majority
community to interfere in minority cultures. Thus, respecting cultural difference
means allowing the minority community
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to govern or police itself. It also seems to
mean that any intervention is determined in
consultation and agreement with self-styled
community and religious leaders, who
are seen as gatekeepers and who, historically, have represented the most powerful
patriarchal and conservative forces in the
community. Multiculturalism, which aims
to promote racial harmony between communities, fails to address problems within
communities, such as oppressive practices
against women and other less powerful
groups. The leaders rarely challenge the
status quo, and the state colludes with
them to deny protection to women within
the community for the sake of maintaining
4
good community or race relations.
On this basis, Siddiqui suggests that
an approach relying on mature multiculturalism is required "that neither
denies equal protection to women from
minority communities nor contributes
to the essentializing and "othering" of
minority communities." 4' In short, what
is required is the bridging of the space
between race and gender: "demanding
black and minority women's rights without trampling on the rights of black and
minority communities."42 Siddiqui also
cautions against reactionary approaches,
such as the adoption of tighter immigration controls, which, she argues, can
adversely impact on both minority and
women's rights.
Although the authors agree that we
need to engage with these issues, fundamental questions regarding the specifics
of such action require further development. Challenging entrenched patriarchal
hierarchies within society and the privileging of male power and sexuality, and
their manifestations of 'honor', is difficult
at best-and, as the above discussion
shows, has the potential to illicit backlash
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 270-71.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 279.
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from ardent proponents of this practice. It
is therefore evident, as "Honor": Crimes,
Paradigms, and Violence against Women
demonstrates, that law-based strategies
alone will be insufficient to tackle the
problem of crimes of honor." Moving forward there is a real need to engage more
closely with other disciplines including,
sociology and anthropology, to name
but two examples, and to ensure that
strategies aimed at combating "crimes of
honor have the necessary level of community resonance and reflect genuine
cross-cultural legitimacy. While it would
be inexcusable to defer to discriminatory cultural practices on the grounds
of protecting multiculturalism, strategies
aimed at reforming crimes of honor must
proceed with the necessary amount of
cultural sensitivity-to do otherwise
would be to hark back to the days of absolutist dogma and colonial imperialism,
an approach which would certainly be
counter-productive to the advancement of
women's rights with respect to crimes of
honor in particular and violence against
women more generally.

VI. CONCLUSION
"Honor": Crimes, Paradigms, and
Violence against Women represents a
significant contribution to legal scholarship addressing the interrelationship
between women, culture, religion, and
the law generally, and crimes of honor
specifically. The editors, Lynn Welchman
and Sara Hossain, are to be celebrated
for bringing together an excellent and
diverse group of scholars that enrich our
understanding of the factual context of
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crimes relating to honor, to their historical
origins, and to the cultural and religious
values that perpetuate them. The book
is not only important for understanding
crimes relating to honor, but also more
generally on how criminal law is used
to stigmatize and stereotype women into
subordinate positions.
The book focuses directly on the interrelationships of law, culture, and religion
and how they define women's identities
and limit their status in societies. It confronts us with the complex questions of
how to address these inter-relationships
and fosters cross-cultural and intra-cultural dialogues, while being sensitive to
the particularities of women's lives and
experiences. By exposing the many different ways in which law stigmatizes women's behaviors, and thus subordinating
them, it will enable future scholars and
activists to develop laws, policies, and
discourses that reinforce women's agency
and rights. Perhaps most importantly, the
book helps to break the silences about
crimes relating to honor, and in so doing
fosters debate and understanding of fears
of censure in the name of honor in other
walks of life.
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Kimberly Nance, Can Literature Promote Justice? Trauma Narrative and
SocialActionin LatinAmerican Testimonio (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2006); ISBN 0826515231
(cloth : alk. paper) 082651524X
(pbk. : alk. paper), 212 pp.
Kimberly Nance begins her study of Latin
American testimonio by pointing out that
although the genre retains an association
with the margin politically, as literature
it is widely recognized as distinct and
influential.1 Nance sets out to explore
what this influence means and where
the congruence of the literary and the
political lies. Her study can also serve as
a useful introduction to the genre, with
an appendix that provides a narrative
history. Nance addresses the contradiction between testimonio's self-proclaimed
intent to bring about political change,
its insistence on the instrumental use of
literature, and its avoidance in most cases
of deliberative rhetoric.
Deliberative rhetoric is the rhetoric of
persuasion. Testimonio, Nance argues, is
most frequently cast in either forensic or
epideictic language. Forensic rhetoric,
she explains, seeks to judge whether
certain actions in the past were just or
not. Epideictic rhetoric accords praise
or blame. Both forensic and epideictic
forms of speech, therefore, stress the
documentary, backward glance of testimonio. The hardship accounted for in
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most testimonio stands as accusation
against the system or individual, but
does little rhetorically to persuade them
to change. However, when testimonio
is written in the deliberative, persuasive
mode, Nance argues, it is characterized
by uncertainty and ambiguity. Those writing in the deliberative mode are often
victims of torture who feel overwhelmed
by their experience and, although they
are looking for solutions, are uncertain
of what future direction to take.2 In
her discussion of torture and language,
Nance evokes Elaine Scarry's Body in
Pain to show that although there might be
an expectation by the reader of "heroic
invulnerability" in the narrative of torture,
the deliberative account of testimonio
usually shows a subject struggling to hold
it together.3 The difference from forensic
and epideictic writing is clear, therefore.
Forensic and epideictic rhetoric "offer
transcendence-a language of clarity,
straightforwardness, certainty." 4 In the
deliberative mode, testimonio becomes a
"genre without a strategy," a phrase posed
by Nance as a question that becomes
the title of her first chapter. It seeks to
persuade of the truth of the victim's experience, although the breakdown of self
that is part of the experience of torture
makes the narrative of it uncertain and
difficult.
In assessing the political effectiveness of testimonio, Nance poses the

2.
3.

Id. at 45.
Id. at 39-40; see
(1985).

4.
5.
6.

NANCE,

ELAINESCARRY, THE

BoDY

Vol. 29

question from the point of view of the
genre's presumed audience. Who do
the authors of testimonio address? This
is a defensive question that reveals a
sense of embarrassment, perhaps best
articulated by Ariel Dorfman's mockery
of 5the "armchair reader" that Nance refers
to. Comfortable middle class readers
consume testimonio yet in the process
aestheticize it instead of turning to action.
Nance explores the reasons for a reader's
resistance through Jean-Francois Lyotard's
concept of the "testimonial contract,"
which she explains as "the relationship
between reader and witness that must
exist if testimony is to result in social action." 6 Nance follows Lyotard's discussion
of the many ways in which the contract
can fail because of the reader's refusal
to read the text as prescribed. From the
point of view of literary studies, this is a
curious expectation. It has become commonplace in literary theory that readers
are powerful shapers of the text.' Nance is
on surer ground when she makes the distinction between an imagined addressee
(often someone the text accuses directly)
and actual readers, who are then put in
the position of "spectator" of the performance of this accusation. 8 The reader as
"spectator" is another common trope in
literary theory perhaps best exemplified
in the theories of realism which rely on
the metaphor of visual recognition as
understanding.9
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supra note 1, at 45.

Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 48.

7. Reader-centered criticism is shaped by "reader-response" theory. For a range of such
theory see READER-RESPONSE
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Nance takes a different theoretical
approach when she turns to the Russian
critic Mikhail Bakhtin for a model of how
to read narratives of suffering. Her analysis begins with this passage from Bahktin's
less widely read, early essay "Author and
Hero in Aesthetic Activity:"
Let us say that there is a human being before
me who is suffering .... I must experience-come to see and know-what he
experiences; I must put myself in his place
and coincide with him, as it were .... But
in any event my projection of myself into
him must be followed by a return into
myself, a return to my own place outside
the suffering person, for only from this
place can the other be rendered meaningful ethically, cognitively, or aesthetically.
If this return into myself did not actually
take place, the pathological phenomenon
of experiencing another's suffering as one's
own would result-an infection with the
other's suffering, and nothing more. 0
Nance stresses in her argument
Bakhtin's insistence on the return to the
self. After the empathetic identification
with the suffering represented in the text,
it is important for the reader to return
and reevaluate himself. Without such a
return, the reader has merely been "infected" and hence, we can assume from
Bakhtin's own language, paralyzed. The
empathy with suffering, Bakhtin lets it
be understood, creates the expectation
of something more happening. What
this might be is the question Nance asks
of testimonio. Although the question is
at first addressed in terms of literature's
instrumentality-the reader's ability to
intervene in the situation described by the
testimonio-in the latter part of her book
Nance increasingly turns the question

10.

back to the reader's own intimate situation which might be quite distant from the
situation of the testimonial speaker.
For Nance, the return to the self must
come in the form of a self-critique, and it
is here that she locates testimonio's greatest potential for social change. In what is
the heart of her argument, she suggests
that for testimonio to be politically effective it must be read differently. Nance
states this most forcefully in her conclusion where she calls for a "testimonial
criticism" that is neither the celebratory
and uncritical reception of testimonio
that was prevalent in the early years,
nor the overly critical treatment that the
genre has received recently in a period
of disillusion with its promise. Nance
defines testimonio as a "social project"
joining speaker, writer, and reader in "a
solidarity founded not on ecstatic fusion
but instead on considered, contingent,
concrete, and undramatic actions in
everyday life."" Nance draws from Gary
Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, the
preeminent Bakhtin scholars, and calls
this approach a "prosaics"-the stress
being on the pun between prose writing and the quotidian.12 Her reliance on
this notion of "prosaics" reveals a desire
to divorce testimonio from sensationalism and to relocate it in the space of
the everyday. Such a gesture is possible
because Nance shifts the emphasis to
some significant degree away from the
experiences described in the texts and
to the experience of reading.
Appealing though this turn in her
argument may be, it is striking how far
it takes her from the book's beginning
where, in her attention to rhetorical

Quoted in NANCE, supra note 1, at 62-63, emphasis in Bakhtin's original. The ellipses
are placed by Nance.
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devices, she stressed the genre's own
appeal to the exceptional. Early in the
book, Nance seemed to be arguing that
testimonio-telling the story of an ordinary person subjected to extraordinary
stress-elicits an extraordinary moment
of enunciation: The testimony itself. In its
epideictic and forensic modes, testimonio
cries out in the certainty and clarity of its
anger. In the deliberative mode, it moves
us through its depiction of the fragility of
the subject. To remain along the grain
of Nance's argument, it is the reader's
job then to integrate these extraordinary
narratives into the quotidian. It is indeed
the very quotidian safety of the reading
experience that she wants to radicalize.
As I have shown, Nance is able to
make this turn in her argument by relying on the passage from Bakhtin that I
quoted above. In the original, the passage is much more extensive, running a
full two pages of text. 3 Indeed, Nance's
use of ellipses here function somewhat
inappropriately to glean from Bakhtin's
own language a summary of his points.
What is lost in the process is Bakhtin's
emphasis on the spectator. In this passage, Bakhtin argues that the spectator is
in fuller possession of the suffering than
the sufferer himself because he is able to
view the sufferer as he suffers. Even if the
person suffering were placed in front of
a mirror he would not know what to do
14
with the spectacle of his own suffering.
Bakhtin argues that "the person suffering
does not experience the fullness of his
own outward expressedness in being;
he experiences this expressedness only
13.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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partially, and then in the language of
his inner sensations of himself. He does
not see the agonizing tension of his own
muscles."" The spectator's witness, therefore, burdens him with a kind of excess
("the excess of [his] own seeing") that
16
he needs to shape into aesthetic form.
I have gotten this far into Bakhtin's provocative text to illustrate that Nance's
emphasis on a self-critical, introspective
turn might be misplaced. Bakhtin's argument in this early work is about how you
write suffering, not how you read it. The
return to the self is that which enables the
spectator to turn into the author.
The reliance on rhetorical analysis
makes Nance's study different from others, like the work of John Beverley, which
appeals to a similar audience of literary
critics and which has focused mostly on
the cultural impact of testimonio. Beverley has argued that testimonio largely fails
as a political instrument. Nance instead
claims that Beverley expects too much
too soon and that the verdict is still out
on what impact testimonio might have
on the political scene.' 7 Addressing the
genre's rhetorical features, Nance claims,
can help us identify why its political impact is not measurable in conventional
terms. The weakness of its deliberative
rhetoric in comparison to the certainty of
its forensic and epideictic modes offers
one explanation. Yet she also adds that
the uncertainty exhibited in the deliberative mode may indicate a different, more
complex engagement, what she calls "the
constancy of critique." 8 This self-questioning, the subject's repeated doubling

M.M. Bakhtin, Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity (ca. 1920-1923), in ART AND ANSWERABILITY:EARLYPHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
BY M.M. BAKHTIN 25-26 (Vadim Liapunov, trans., Michael
Holquist & Vadim Liapunov eds., 1990).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 25.
Id.
NANCE, supra note 1, at 14.
Id. at 34.
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over to re-examine changing perceptions
of particular experiences-establishes a
more analytical practice of testimony
which may have a longer and more lasting impact than the shock effect of accusation, Nance claims. Nance points out
that readers of testimonio have hesitated
to take a close look at the textual features
of the genre in fear that any analysis
which points out its status as representation, and hence its artificiality, will erode
its potential political influence as an
authentic account. 19 And it is precisely
this kind of close textual analysis that
Nance advocates and performs herself
in readings of examples from a number
of texts by Rigoberta Menchu, Alicia
Partnoy, Esteban Montejo, Carolina Maria
de Jesus, and others.
Although Nance mentions "just world
theory" and her title alludes to justice,
this is not a well developed aspect of
her book. By coming back to the theme
of justice explicitly at the end and linking it to her advocacy of a prosaics of
testimonio, Nance could have clarified
how justice fits into her argument. Furthermore, although rich in its theoretical
allusions, the book does not engage other
canons of testimony (the holocaust, for
example) in any sustained way. The lack
of a comparative dimension limits the
book's ability to make larger claims about
testimony.
Eleni Coundouriotis
University of ConnecticutEndnotes
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History: Colonialism, Ethnography and the
Novel (Columbia University Press 1999) and
has published widely on African literature,
diaspora, and nationalism. Her current project
focuses on war narratives from Africa.

Repression and Mobilization (Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston,
& Carol Mueller eds., University
of Minnesota Press, 2005), ISBN
0816644268 (pb : alk. paper)
081664425X (hc : alk. paper), 258
PP.
Political events after September 11 make
Repression and Mobilization a timely and
prophetic book. "Repression" and "mobilization," scientific euphemisms perhaps,
refer to the way researchers study violent
interactions at a collective level that
compromise legitimacy and evoke the
pathos of "contentious politics." Revolutions, strikes, ethnic conflicts, and social
movements are examples. The essays in
the collection follow from a conference
at the University of Maryland in the summer of 2001 and are edited by Christian
Davenport, Hank Johnston, and Carol
Mueller. Charles Davenport thoughtfully
introduces the book's essays in the introduction, and in the last two chapters
Charles lily and Mark Lickbach provide a
theoretical overview of the collection.
The authors demonstrate a tight loyalty
to the rigors of an empirical epistemology. While studying their subject, they
wrestle reflectively with methodological
issues in research and the processes of
empirical investigation. The book is ab-

Id. at 29. She singles out George Yudice and Doris Sommer's work in particular as being
too reverential.
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stract because of an excessive concern
for positivistic legitimacy and a shunning
of theoretically general accounts. Charles
Tilly, for instance, insists, "coherent explanations are possible-but not in the
form of general laws." 1 The codings, typologies, descriptions, and explanations
throughout the book are indeed logical
and coherent, but they remain somehow
unsatisfactory. Tilly says again, "[This
research project] does not, however, call
for summing of whole classes of episodes
(e.g., revolutions, strikes, ethnic conflicts,
and social movements) in pursuit of their
common properties. It aims at explaining
change and variation, not at discovering
2
uniformity."
Repression and mobilization are two
poles in a confounding dichotomy, a
paradox locked in a tit for tat logic that
appears to researchers to be causal. Repression involves the efforts of authorities
(often violent) to inhibit and suppress
activity by potential or actual opponents.
Mobilization involves a group's polling of
resources with respect to shared interests
and political action in a given direction.
As the authors explain, repression can
shape mobilization and mobilization
repression. Tilly indicates that it is necessary for social researchers to do more to
transform this dichotomy into a fruitful
dialectic, albeit with a disheartening
qualification: "But those interactions
do not conform to covering laws; at the
most general level, for example, repression sometimes flattens resistance, but
sometimes magnifies it. How and why?" 3
The statement is discouraging. What is
needed to explain how and why repres-

1.

REPRESSION
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sion sometimes flattens resistance and
sometimes magnifies resistance is also
taken off the table. Can researchers, without reference to general laws, answer the
pressing question that Tilly raises? I think
not. A consequence of September 11 is
hopefully not an amnesia within social
science of the concepts of legitimacy and
social order.
The authors are sophisticated on the
methodological and epistemological issues, but they are less so on the theoretical
ones. The writing of Theda Skocpol helps
depict the problem, albeit in a negative
way. In States and Social Revolutions
Skocpol makes the following statement:
"not only does an organizational, realist
perspective on the state entail differences
from Marxist approaches, it also contrasts
with non-Marxist approaches that treat
the legitimacy of political authorities
as an important explanatory concept."4
Skocpol's approach toward the study of
the state contrasts with not only Marxist
approaches but also non-Marxist approaches. Skocpol's approach does not
treat the legitimacy of political authorities
as an important explanatory concept,
which is what non-Marxist approaches
such as Max Weber's do. Skocpol goes
on to explain the reasoning behind her
realistic approach: "If state organizations cope with whatever tasks they
already claim smoothly and efficiently,
legitimacy-either in the sense of moral
approval or in the probably much more
usual sense of sheer acceptance of the
status quo--will probably be accorded
to the state's form and rulers by most
groups in society."' Notice that concepts
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such as rational-legal authority, traditional authority, or charismatic authority
are of no importance to this analysis of
the nexus between repression and mobilization. Normative moral orientations
such as human rights are also irrelevant.
Skocpol then explains the upshot of
the realist position: "Even after great
loss of legitimacy has occurred, a state
can remain quite stable-and certainly
invulnerable to internal mass-based revolts--especially if its coercive organi6
zations remain coherent and effective."
Skocpol's approach displaces Weber's
distinction between authority and power,
and power alone becomes the singular
explanatory concept.
Davenport laments this same problem
in his introduction, "Unfortunately, this
normative emphasis on the preservation
of human life and freedom of expression
has not been linked to ...the implications of the repress ion-mobilization nexus
for social science." 7 In his concluding
chapter Tilly singles out Davenport and
resists Davenport's "distant hope" that,
"once we clear away conceptual and empirical debris," we will begin to see how
repression and mobilization "conform to
general laws.""
The task at this point is to suggest
how general laws do inform research on
repression and mobilization such that
this dichotomy becomes a dialectic and
the question of how and why repression
sometimes suppresses mobilization and
sometimes magnifies it is answered. Here
is one suggestion that stresses legitimacy
as an an important explanatory concept:
How does a government control the
governed? One way in which a govern-

6.
7.
8.
9.

ment controls the governed, as Skocpol
explains, is through the use of force and
fraud. If, though, all that a government
does is control the governed, no matter
how efficiently and effectively, it is not
truly a government. Such a government
only resorts to increasingly sophisticated
forms of force and fraud, and this is the
road to hell. The government itself is out
of control.9
A government is also obliged to
control itself. What, though, obliges a
government to control itself? With rational-legal authority, there is one way
to oblige a government to control itself,
namely, when the government gives priority to human rights. Giving priority to
human rights is tantamount to a government controlling itself. The commitment
to human rights obliges a government to
control itself as it controls the governed.
Indeed, a commitment to human rights
wins the consent of the governed to be
governed. Thus, the best, most efficient,
and so, ultimately, most rational way for
a government to control the governed
is for the government to respect human
rights. Why? By respecting human rights
a government wins the consent of the
governed to be controlled by what also
controls the government.
Keith Doubt
Wittenberg University
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richly detailed, open-ended, and hardly
linear in the conventional sense of academic argument. Yet it is also fully engaging and surprisingly easy to read, all the
more so since the work's structure lends
itself to intermittent engagements and
allows for easy re-entry. Thus Shadows of
War is the rare sort of academic text that
does lend itself to actual teaching, not to
mention engagements with a wider audiCountless dispatches, novels and memoirs reveal the personal experience of ence who care less about specific debates
war to be deeply chaotic. And yet the in literature than about having an inkling
political analysis of war remains decep- of what might actually be going on in the
world. I recently included excerpts of it
tively clear, describing struggles between
in a large undergraduate course, and was
states and defined interests, all neatly
impressed by the number of students who
ordered through statistics and maps.
found
it revelatory.
Inan ambitious and provocative work,
begins the introductory
Nordstrom
Carolyn Nordstrom sets out to bridge this
divide by tracking warfare ethnographi- section by noting that "war" is an imposcally on the ground. Following conflict sible word, encompassing widely varying
across places like Mozambique, Sri forms of human experience. Moreover,
Lanka, and Angola, she finds not only she suggests, extra-state activities remain
invisible when the focus remains on
the small stories of splintered lives, but
also an elusive, uncharted landscape political conflict. Social science is methodologically hamstrung when it comes
of connections they share in common.
to accounting for activities that happen
of
further
suggests
that
much
Nordstrom
between places among actors who take
what actually transpires in contemporary
up multiple roles. Her solution is to emwar zones happens in what she calls the
phasize ethnography, the anthropological
"shadows"-a zone beginning at the
edge of official state order and extending tradition of direct, experiential investigation. But hers is an undisciplined, opporinto the heart of legal darkness. Our actunistic form of scholarship, one that can
counts of international events, centered
on formal campaigns, policy initiatives, "follow the question" without stopping at
either geographic or conceptual borders.
economic sectors, aid organizations, and
the like, are at best incomplete. Neither At the same time she stresses the need to
war nor peace registers fully in public protect sources, and allow some silences
to remain. Only through such an aprecords.
The book contains five parts, further proach, she suggests, and the acceptance
divided into seventeen chapters, all ar- of the partial, incomplete knowledge it
ranged to sequentially explore themes of can provide, can we begin to glimpse
war, extra-state activities, and problems the range of extra-state activities related
of peace. In addition, there is a short to warfare.
Nordstrom then recounts a conversapostscript addressing Iraq. Throughout,
the author interweaves anecdotes, quota- tion between several iconic inhabitants of
war zones: a doctor, a journalist, a mertions from her interlocutors, analysis, and
photographs of people and artifacts found chant and an nongovernmental (NGO)
in war zones. The overall assemblage is staffer. Knowing and war-weary, they

Carolyn Nordstrom, Shadows of
War: Violence, Power and International Profiteeringin the Twenty-First
Century (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2004), 293 pp. with
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sketch the landscape of their existence.
They have every reason and opportunity
to leave it, and yet nonetheless continue
to remain on the job out of a larger
loyalty to community. Why, Nordstrom
wonders through the following chapter, does much of the content of such
war conversations leach out of larger
accounts of war? Why do accounts of
events like riots ignore specific stories
in favor of generalized images of violation? She suggests there are a number of
uncomfortable truths that quietly vanish
amid conventional narrations: that in
contemporary warfare most casualties are
civilian; that victims of war often suffer
at the hands of military actors; that no
matter who shoots or wins, certain elites
profit from the opportunities that conflict
brings. As well, we cling to neat moral
divisions between legal and clandestine
worlds, ignoring any evidence that they
might readily coincide on the ground.
Although everyone may know that war
is a business, everyone may not realize
just how much of a business it can be.
International actors may be stingy when it
comes to funding peace and recovery, but
they can happily fuel military consumption over many years, both directly and by
allowing things to happen. Morality and
reality, Nordstrom reminds her readers,
do not simply coincide.
The second section on war underscores the difficulty of simply fixing war
in place or time. Front lines extend well
beyond troop positions when conflict
involves international networks and business interests, sometimes woven together
and sometimes falling apart. Thus an
Angolan man can be stabbed in a bathtub
in Mozambique and spirited away, one
probable victim who will never make
a casualty roll. Conditions of violence,
moreover, focus people on survival rather
than planning, and can substitute any
future with a passion for revenge. If so,

when can war be said to end? When a
Sri Lankan military commander confides
doubts about his ability to control his
troops, on edge amid the shadow play
of guerrilla warfare, the neat terms and
units of standard military analysis appear but a thin facade. Yet few in power,
Nordstrom suggests, dare to acknowledge
how fragile their grasp might actually be.
She quotes Nietzsche, that "the doing is
everything," and follows it with the image
of a child soldier who had forgotten why
he was fighting. A soldier's experience,
she reminds us, involves far more than
combat, and ultimately warfare becomes
a way of life.
In the third section Nordstrom enters
the "shadows" of her title. An emergency
relief plane, she discovers, can ferry aid
by day and illicit goods by night. Mozambican banks can "lose" $400 million.
Moreover, the same cast of profiteers
pops up in war zone after war zone
across the globe. Corruption, she realizes, is at least as much an international
problem as a national one, particularly
when traffic in many goods, including
weapons, requires flows of hard currency.
States may quietly participate in many
of the activities they publicly denounce,
and extra-state mechanisms lie waiting
for those who would avoid regulation,
including informal banking networks
(such as the hawala system) and street
rates of exchange. Nordstrom stresses
the importance of recognizing the ethnographic reality of this actually existing
global economy; whatever ethical questions it may raise, it is clearly successful.
She prefers the term "shadows" to that
of illegal, since many of the actors and
networks involved in this trade cross back
and forth the line of the law. She suggests
that extra-state phenomena are far more
central to world economies than we like
to acknowledge, noting a 1998 estimate
that as much as 90 percent of economic
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activity in Angola's economy might be
informal, as well as Charles Tilly's argument about the significance of organized
crime in the historical formation of European states. Following this logic, the
outlines of emerging world order show
more clearly in marginal war zones and
trade in commodities like diamonds, than
in centers of geopolitical influence and
regulated markets.
The fourth section addresses peace,
a condition Nordstrom also sees defined
in uncertain practice across front lines
rather than official accords. Once shadow
networks are in place, she reminds us,
they acquire their own habits and institutions, many of which can continue even
after regime change. Practices born in
war become "the way things are done,"
often by many of the same people. After
presenting the autobiographical narrative
of an Angolan man named Peace, suffused with the longings and frustrations
of a particular life, she describes a more
ambiguous state, the "time of not-warnot-peace" featuring low-intensity warfare under the fragile cover of cease fires
and peace processes. War, she suggests,
can often be what Michael Taussig calls
a public secret; a truth everyone knows
but no one speaks. Rather than definitions of war and peace, or bemoaning
the absence of a state in a war zone,
Nordstrom prefers to focus on lived experiences of survival. As she learned from
a group of orphaned children living in a
drain in Mozambique, community can be
fashioned almost anywhere. Meanwhile,
the UN can be spending a million dollars a day preparing the country for post
conflict elections, most of the money
looping back to industries and personnel
from wealthier places.
In a short fifth section, Nordstrom
explores the way in which informal
economies serve very ordinary needs as
well as profiteering. For people with few
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alternate opportunities for consumption,
unregulated exchange can provide them
with the means of survival. By way of
illustration Nordstrom points to thriving
street markets for pharmaceutical drugs,
some pilfered, some counterfeit and all
priced far below official equivalents. In
war-torn settings extra-state transactions
only grow in significance, and constitute
the only realistic basis for development.
Why, she then asks, are we so reluctant
to study the shadows? International institutions such as the UN and World Bank
may recognize that official numbers only
represent a fraction of economic activity
in settings like Angola, but they devote
little time to studying that which they are
missing. Part of the problem, Nordstrom
suggests, is simply lack of vocabulary,
and assumptions about the centrality
of the state. Part of it may stem from
difficulties in quantifying activities that
go unrecorded, and the reluctance of
economists to engage in extensive field
research. In addition to such practical and
epistemological barriers, Nordstrom also
adds a political one: such research might
be dangerous, not only to those undertaking it, but also to the formal institutions
at the center of our usual conceptions of
power. She then closes the book with a
portrait of the town of Kuito, in Angola,
its people surviving and clinging to dignity amid ruins. A postscript addresses
recent developments, noting how rarely
US media actually portrays the Iraq war
in terms of experience, as well as the
significant emergence of Al Qaeda as an
extra-state network.
In her acknowledgments, Nordstrom
notes that she once attempted to write a
novel about a war orphan, based on the
theme that in war only fiction rings true.
Although this work is not a novel, it does
tread the same borderline of belief. The
author makes use of scholarly references
and statistics, but relies even more on the
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power of compelling details to convey a
deeper sense of veracity to the reader. It
is to her credit that they work. At times
some of the quotations may appear too
exact, or the characterizations too drawn
from a morality tale, but the narrative
always remains compelling, rescued both
by its haunting fragments of specificity
and the larger truth they reveal. Alongside more standard images of shattered
buildings, Nordstrom includes snapshots
of signs advertising lessons in magic from
"Titus the Wizard," not to mention "Good
Hope Arms and Ammunition," as well
as a children's home in a storm drain,
and a soldier demanding his portrait at
gunpoint. All carry with them an active
sense of life in wartime well beyond the
gross facts of conflict. Like her opening
anecdote about a woman carrying a
watermelon with her through riot torn
Sri Lanka, they reach beyond expected
images of violation, endurance, and
suffering and suggest a more complex

human experience of violence. And who
can argue with her larger point about the
limits of knowledge beyond the frontier
of law, where things certainly happen but
are rarely recorded? In form as well as
content, Nordstrom's work suggests that
the reality of war involves fundamental
uncertainty, and that to grasp it one must
accept an incomplete picture. Whether
or not Nordstrom always convinces, she
reliably provokes in a deeply generative
way. Anyone concerned with human
rights amid contemporary warfare should
read this book.
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